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Abstract
In democracies, one of Public Service Media’s (PSM) main roles is to inform the public. In a digital news ecosystem, where
commercial, citizen, and alternative news sources have multiplied, questions about the ability and need for PSM to fulfil
this role are increasingly being raised. While the role of PSM can and should be scrutinized, a too-narrow a focus on an
informed citizenry may obfuscate aspects, other than audience reach and objectivity, that are key to this information role,
such as trust. Against this background, this article studies whether and to what extent citizens still trust the news and
information services of their public broadcaster, asking if that trust is still high, whether there is a difference between
groups in the population, and if trust is in line with reach. Based on a representative survey of news users in Flanders,
the Dutch-speaking community of Belgium, the article studies the reach and trust scores of the brands of VRT, Flanders’
PSM, and compares them to those of its main competitors, with a specific focus on differences in terms of age, education
levels, and political orientation. The results suggest that VRT struggles more than the main commercial players to reach
young people and the lower-educated, but still leads when it comes to trust. The data show the continued importance of
widening our assessment of PSM beyond market-focused indicators of reach.
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1. Introduction
Public Service Media (PSM) can be defined as the provi-
sion ofmedia services, across devices and platforms, that
contributes to the democratic, cultural and social wellbe-
ing of society (see contributions in Lowe &Martin, 2013;
Lowe, Van den Bulck, & Donders, 2018). Often, the deliv-
ery of such services is entrusted to public broadcasters.
For all of them, strengthening informed citizenship is an,
if not their most, important task. PSM has a “responsibil-
ity for the health of the political process and the quality
of public discourse generated with it” (Blumler, as cited
in Hesmondhalgh, 2019, pp. 152). Having said that, four
trends have hindered public broadcasters in their work
to inform the citizenry.
First, the online environment results in lower reach
of public broadcasters’ news services and, particularly
with younger audiences, as well as encouraging the rapid
consumption of news (Cola & Prario, 2012). Second, the
rise of disinformation comes with lower trust in tradi-
tional media outlets (Fletcher & Park, 2017). The line be-
tween what is true and what is false seems to have be-
come more blurred and public broadcasters are finding
it difficult to position themselves in a ‘post-truth society’
(Gibson, 2018); even if that latter concept has been right-
fully criticised by some (e.g., Fuller, 2018). Third, and re-
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lated to the former, a rise of populism in a multitude
of EU Member States puts additional pressure on legacy
news media and allegedly ‘leftist’ and progressive pub-
lic broadcasters (Wettstein, Esser, Schulz, Wirz, & Wirth,
2018). In some countries such as Poland and Hungary,
the re-balancing of powers and the strive for pluralism
between conservative and progressive, left- and right-
wing ideologies, etc., has resulted in a complete po-
litical capture of the PSM system (Reporters Without
Borders, 2019). In other countries, it at least creates
the possibility of self-censorship with journalists who
fear #lügenpresse, #MSM, #fakenews, etc. Fourth, most
European public broadcasters have faced budget cuts
over the last few years, making it more difficult to main-
tain investment in journalism (European Broadcasting
Union, 2018).
Against this background, we studied whether and to
what extent citizens still trust the news and information
services of their public broadcaster, asking if that trust is
still high, whether there is a difference between groups
in the population, and if trust is in line with reach.
The focus of our analysis is Flanders, the Dutch-
speaking region of Belgium with 6.5 million inhabitants.
The Flemish media market is rather concentrated with
only four (cross)-media companies supplying a signif-
icant portion of the audience with news: DPGMedia,
Mediahuis, Roularta, and VRT. DPG Media has been
particularly wide-ranging, covering newspapers, maga-
zines, online brands, television and radio. Mediahuis and
Roularta are mainly active in print and online. VRT offers
services on radio, television, and online. DPGMedia leads
in print and online news, followed by Mediahuis, while
VRT has the highest market share in radio and televi-
sion (Vlaamse Regulator voor deMedia, 2020). There are
smaller online news sites, such as Doorbraak.be, SCEPTR
and Apache, but these are niche publications. The first
two are more partisan right-wing outlets although they
do impact public opinion, whereas the latter has greater
impact on political debate.
Public service broadcasting takes a key position in
both the French and Dutch speaking communities, which
are autonomous in their decision-making on PSM.While
both can be seen as democratic corporatist systems
(Hallin & Mancini, 2004), there are notable differences
though with more pressure in Flanders from commercial
competitors and right-wing politicians to limit VRT in its
activities, specifically online. That has also resulted in de-
clining government funding since 2007, the rejection of a
pre-school children’s channel after an ex ante evaluation,
and a Government Agreement in 2019 which mentioned
the Flemish Government’s intentions to limit the amount
of text in online news. Remarkable according to some
(Donders, Van den Bulck, & Raats, 2019) given that the
Flemish media market is so concentrated and the public
broadcaster thus adds to not only internal but also exter-
nal pluralism.
While applauded for its high-quality service delivery,
criticism from the main right-wing parties for its alleged
political bias as well as for distorting the online market
is on the rise (Donders, Van den Bulck, & Raats, 2018).
It is not clear whether this trend in opinion is also likely
to be observed among audiences. Based on a represen-
tative survey among Flemish citizens, we find high lev-
els of trust in the Flemish public broadcaster VRT, al-
though having that said, results are slightly different for
young people and right-wing voters. The article consists
of five parts. First, we formulate a problem statement
and key research questions in the introduction. Second,
we theorise what task public broadcasters have in the
area of news and information, relating this to the need
for citizens’ trust in the impartiality of public broadcast-
ers. Third, we explain the methodology underlying the
representative survey, then we present our findings, and
finally, we outline our conclusions and reflect on the im-
portance of trust in PSM.
2. PSM, Informed Citizenship and Trust
2.1. PSM and Informed Citizenship
Information provision has been a core task of public
broadcasters ever since their creation in the 1930s (Price
& Raboy, 2003). Public broadcasters should inform citi-
zenships, confront people with different viewpoints, and
in so doing strengthen democracy (Van den Bulck, 2016).
Political citizenship is thus not only about being informed,
but also about having access to different interpretative
frameworks and deliberative fora where information can
be discussed and evaluated. Political citizenship requires
pluralism, which is not the same as an abundance of con-
tent. Structural pluralism, so Beata Klimkiwiecz (2010,
p. 907) says, “refers to a condition where diverse, inde-
pendent media entities exist within a system and are ar-
ranged together in a particular way.” Allen, Connolly, and
Hargreaves Heap (2017, p. 47) seemedia pluralism as “an
essential pillar in the right to information and freedom
of expression.” It requires the representation of all rele-
vant opinions and the potential for citizens to engage in
a debate rather than acting as mere spectators. Citizens
should be part of a process of interaction and genuine
dialogue within some sort of public sphere (Habermas,
1991) and this should not be eroded to the point where
news is only consumed (Scannell, 1995, pp. 23–24; see
also McQuail, 1998, p. 140).
As maintained by Picard and Pickard (2018, p. 16) “a
healthy democracy requires opportunities for citizens to
deliberate in public spaces that are largely independent
of state and market forces.” The European understand-
ing of media pluralism as a necessary condition for po-
litical citizenship goes beyond rejecting government con-
trol over media; it extends to avoiding commercial inter-
ests from becoming so overly dominant that they inhibit
the free, pluralistic exchange of media services (Czepek,
Hellwig, & Novak, 2009). That opinion diverges signifi-
cantly from the US model where the freedom of indi-
vidual media owners is placed above the equal right of
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all citizens to receive information as well as to express
their opinions (Humphreys, 1996). While the ‘free mar-
ketplace of ideas’ has not delivered—look for example at
the low voter turnouts—also several EU Member States
have adoptedmedia policies that are inspired by libertar-
ian ideas.
There is disagreement on whether public broadcast-
ers have contributed to informed citizenship. Research
indeed shows higher levels of current affairs knowl-
edge among citizens who access strong public broadcast-
ing systems (Soroka et al., 2013). People watching pub-
lic broadcasters learn more about domestic and inter-
national affairs than those watching commercial news.
Factors such as independence, adequate public funding,
and audience share are relevant factors in determining
levels of hard news in particular (Soroka et al., 2013).
Some scholars have been more critical though, point-
ing to public broadcasters’ insufficient investment in
investigative journalism (Cordell, 2009) and their lack
of criticism of ruling parties which largely results from
funding issues and/or institutional weakness (Stetka &
Örnebring, 2013). Furthermore, they have been criti-
cised for reporting in overly dramatic manners without
paying adequate attention to the historical context of
serious issues such as the financial crisis in 2008/2009
(Berry, 2013), as well as for plainly being mouthpieces
of government (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006). Public broadcast-
ers, some research shows, have gone along with the po-
larization of public discourse, without critically question-
ing statements made by politicians (e.g., related to the
Brexit referendum, see Cushion & Lewis, 2017), or have
failed to represent all opinions in society, specifically
those of ethnic minorities (Panis, Paulussen, & Dhoest,
2019). Some also argue that there has been a heavy em-
phasis on one-directional knowledge transfer (Bardoel
& Lowe, 2007) rather than a two-way understanding of
political processes, current affairs, and events in society.
Overall, one could conclude that public broadcasters in
Western and Northern European countries have demon-
strably contributed to informed citizenship while being
imperfect in delivering that objective in several ways.
2.2. Informed Citizenship and Trust
The discussion on the role of PSM has intensified in a
context of internationalisation, further commodification
of media users, and disinformation. While some argue
that the role of public broadcasters becomes more im-
portant (Ramsey, 2018), somemarket failure thinking on
PSM is on the rise again. The questioning of the BBC li-
cense fee in the UK by conservative politicians is a case
in point. They point at the digital environment which has
rendered the BBC a dinosaur as well as at its allegedly
biased reporting.
Underlying these various contesting views on the per-
formance of PSM is the ideal of an informed citizenry,
one that consists of rational, information-seeking, polit-
ically engaged citizens—which is still the default view
amongst media professionals (Graves, 2017, p. 1242).
Indeed, as is clear from the above, this view is dominant
in newsrooms and with policymakers and academics as
well, even if it has been contested before (Graeff, 2019).
Will this view hold against the background of a ‘global
democratic recession’ during which we witness, among
others, the growing popularity of right-wing national-
ist parties, a severe EU political crisis, and the unnerv-
ing political theatre of the US president (Graves, 2017,
p. 1239)? The sense of crisis revolves around the ero-
sion of accountability in the media system. Van Aelst et
al. (2017, p. 12) consider that the rise of partisan media
forms a key challenge for the political information en-
vironment as it leads to “opportunity structures for se-
lective exposure based on political attitudes and beliefs”
rather than on factual information. In its most radical ar-
ticulation, this means that facts and truth do not mat-
ter, and the current distributed media ecosystem seems
to further amplify those who pursue ‘post-truth politics’
(Suiter, 2016) which challenges the democratic public
sphere and promotes societal conflict.
If facts do not matter, then what are the benefits
of an informed citizenry? Such a context forces us to
revisit our understanding of information in relation to
citizenship. An interesting case concerns fact-checking
as a solution to false information (Nieminen & Rapeli,
2018). While still inconclusive, various studies seem to
suggest that fact-checking might increase factual knowl-
edge, but that this does not necessarily affect citizens’
ideological beliefs and political choices (see Tucker et al.,
2018). In the US, for example, when the mainstreamme-
dia went to great lengths to challenge conspiracy reports
that linked Hillary Clinton to a child trafficking ring run
from a pizza shop, the many people who distrust ‘liberal’
media saw this rather as a confirmation that there was
something to investigate (Boyd, 2017).
At this point, trust enters the equation. As Strömbäck
et al. (2020) suggest, informative news media will hardly
lead to the democratic ideal of an informed citizenry if
citizens do not consume or do not trust the news. We
might thereby tend to think that the consumption of a
certain news source implies the source is trusted. The au-
thors are however keen to stress the complexity of the
relationship between news trust and news use:
Overall previous research suggests that media trust
is associated with greater use of news media while
media distrust is associated with greater use of non-
mainstream news sources, but that the relationship
between media trust and media use is quite modest.
(Strömbäck et al., 2020, p. 8)
On top of that, news use is not always an instrumental
practice driven by a rational, informative and selective
orientation towards the media, but can also be more
ritual, driven by distraction, affection and habits (Rubin,
2002, pp. 534–535). This can even lead to people using
news they do not trust, e.g., when their need for cog-
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nition is higher than their distrust in the news (Tsfati
& Cappella, 2005) or their orientation towards conve-
nience leads them to choose less trusted over more
trusted news (Jarvis, Stroud, & Gilliland, 2009).
What is clear though, is that news use and news trust
do not necessarily match. In other words, reach is not
necessarily an indicator of trust. Exactly this differentia-
tion is often lacking in the way news organisations, PSM
included, assess their goals. Traditionally, VRT in Flanders,
in line with other PSMs in Western democracies, has
been required through their charter agreements with
the subsidising governments, to cater to a wide audi-
ence (e.g., Vlaamse Regering & VRT, 2011, 2015). The
idea that a PSM organisation should be there for all cit-
izens has been a leeway for reach to become a central
measurement to assess a PSM’s success, much in line
with commercial logics (Donders, 2012). In the pressured
news ecosystem described above, this focus on reach,
further emphasized by editorial analytics entering the
newsroom, has led to critical scrutiny.
Journalism scholar Jay Rosen (2018) put it well when
he wondered what a news organization would look like if
it were not optimized for reach, but for trust? Admittedly,
optimising for trust is not without problems; alternative
media, populist politicians and fearmongers on any side
of the political spectrum have all mastered ways to gain
people’s trust, regardless of the truth. Rosen himself has
addressed this issue by recalibrating his question of how
to generate trust by publishing news that still adheres to
high standards of verification. It is exactly at this inter-
section between information, reach and trust that one
of journalism’s key challenges materialises. As partisan
media do not need to balance trust with factuality and
commercial media might find it challenging because of
stringentmarket conditions, PSMorganisations—at least
those who are financially and politically independent—
are the media actors par excellence to take up the chal-
lenge to combine reach with trust.
Coming back to the notion of an informed citizenry,
this approach requires us to rethink its centrality in our
conception of democratic, factual, and trustworthy news
offerings. In her critical assessment of the conception of
trust in news media, Fisher (2016, p. 461) points out the
issue regarding the normative link between news and in-
formed citizenry:
Relying on the assumption that the news consumer
will interpret trust based on traditional conceptions
of reliability and accuracy bound up in the ideal of the
informed citizen, does not adequately accommodate
how and why people are accessing news media.
The kind of citizenship she is hinting at is one with “an
orientation towards a public world, including politics
and broader public issues, beyond matters of purely pri-
vate concern” (Couldry, Livingstone, & Markham, 2007;
p. xv). Such a view on citizenry adheres much more to
Schudson’s (1995, p. 169) notion of a monitorial citizen:
We cannot always be fully informed about what hap-
pens in society, but we should be sufficiently informed
to recognize possible threats to our personal and collec-
tive wellbeing.
If the objective is to have a widely informed public,
then reach is an important metric. If the goal is to make
sure that when needed, people can turn to relevant in-
formation, a degree of trust becomes essential. The ques-
tion is then: Do citizens still trust PSMorganisations? This
article will, therefore, look at the performance of PSM or-
ganisations in terms of reach and trust, and in doing so,
complement a view that ‘maximizes on reach’ and relates
to an ‘informed citizenry’ with a view that ‘maximises on
trust’ and relates to a ‘publicly connected citizenry.’
2.3. Operationalising Trust in the News
While research into trust in themedia has a long research
tradition, a single definition or reliable operationalisa-
tion of news trust is lacking in the literature (Fisher, 2016,
p. 455). An important part of that conceptual vagueness
is due to the notion of ‘media’ variably referring across
studies to media in general, to different media types, to
media as institutions, to individual media outlets, to jour-
nalists, as well as to the content or topic of media cover-
age (Strömbäck et al., 2020, p. 9). In an effort to increase
conceptual clarity, Strömbäck et al. (2020, p. 10) suggest
a central focus on trust in the information coming from
newsmedia rather than trust in themedia as institutions
or in individual news producers.
To a large extent, we adhere to this perspective. In
the study, respondents were asked to denote whether
they agree or disagree, via a 1–5-point Likert scale, with
the following statement: ‘I think you can trust most news
most of the time.’ An equivalent question was asked for
trust in the news one consumes, news in social media,
and news in search engines, always leaving the concept
open to the interpretation of the respondent (see also
Fletcher & Park, 2017, p. 1290). However, the argumen-
tation proposed by Strömbäck and his colleagues once
more puts central the idea of an informed citizenry that
needs verified, reliable, and factual information to play
its democratic role. Then indeed, the most important
thing is that citizens trust the information in itself.
But when considering a publicly connected citizenry,
trust in the news providers becomes equally impor-
tant. Rather than continuously engaging in information-
gathering, people are mainly busy living their own lives,
and in doing somight often just scan the headlines, while
trying to remain alert and ready to respond to news that
affects their lives (Graves, 2017, p. 1243). In navigating
the high choice news environment, they develop episte-
mological strategies to assess which news to trust. One
such strategy is pragmatic trust, where news users con-
fide in specific news sources based on personal experi-
ence but also institutional reputation (Schwarzenegger,
2020, p. 371). In this study,we therefore also look at trust
in news brands. Respondents were invited to answer the
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question: ‘How trustworthy would you say news from
the following brand is?’—on the condition that they had
heard of the brand and without differentiating for the
device or channel they used to access the brand. A scale
from 0 to 10 was used where 0 is ‘not at all trustworthy’
and 10 is ‘completely trustworthy.’
3. Methodology
In this article, we use the raw data of the 2020 Digital
News Report (Newman, Fletcher, Schulz, Andi, & Nielsen,
2020). The surveywas conducted by YouGovwith respon-
dents from an online panel in January 2020—just be-
fore the COVID-19 pandemic hit most countries—across
40 markets spread over six continents. The data set used
for this article concerns 980 news users from Flanders
(the Dutch-speaking region of Belgium), is representative
of the online population and is weighted according to tar-
gets on variables such as age, gender, and education.
Our focus of the analysis was mainly on questions
relating to reach and trust, limiting the analysis to the
brands of VRT and its main commercial counterparts.
We break down the results according to three socio-
demographic dimensions: age, education level, and po-
litical orientation. For age, we choose to differentiate
within the younger age groups when presenting the data,
as younger people are more likely to have a preference
for non-mainstream news sources than older people
(Fletcher & Park, 2017, p. 1292). We work with three
brackets: 18 to 24 years, 25 to 34 years, and 35 years
and older. For education levels, we asked 10 categories,
which we recoded into lower education (all levels up
to upper secondary education), middle (from upper sec-
ondary education to short-cycle tertiary education), and
higher education (bachelors, masters and doctorates).
For political orientation, we asked respondents to po-
sition themselves on a left–right political scale ranging
from ‘very left-wing’ and ‘fairly left-wing’ to ‘slightly
left of centre,’ ‘centre’ and ‘slightly right of centre,’ to
‘fairly right-wing’ and ‘very right-wing,’ recoding them ac-
cordingly into left, centre, and right. For each of these
sociodemographic variables, statistical significance was
tested via a One-way ANOVA test for the dependent vari-
able (brand trust scores) and calculated using a Tukey
post-hoc test (see Supplementary File Annex 2).
For reach, the question was divided into one for of-
fline and one for online brands. For offline media, the
question was formulated so as to encompass all forms
of use, including delayed viewing of radio and television;
for onlinemedia, the question encompassed all channels
or devices used, including via apps and social media. The
respondents were asked to mark the brands they used
three days a week or more. In the analysis, we interpret
this as use on a regular basis. For VRT, this means that
the following channels were included: the main televi-
sion channel één, the information and cultural channel
Canvas, the information radio channel Radio 1, as well as
the popular radio channel Radio 2, the alternative niche
radio channel Stubru, and the niche entertainment radio
MNM. In the presentation of the data, we grouped the
television channels under VRT TV, the generalist radio
channels under VRT Radio (broad), and the niche radio
channels under VRT Radio (niche).
We benchmark the results against the most popu-
lar news brands in Flanders on the one hand and key
‘quality’ news brands on the other hand. The most pop-
ular brands include the television station VTM, the ra-
dio station Q Music and the newspaper Het Laatste
Nieuws, all owned by DPG Media, and the newspaper
Het Nieuwsblad, owned by Mediahuis. The quality news
brands include the newspapers De Standaard, owned by
Mediahuis, and De Morgen, owned by DPG Media. This
gives a similar picture online. For VRT, the general news
brand VRT NWS is probed—also in the brand trust ques-
tion. For the popular media, the online counterparts of
Het Laatste Nieuws, Het Nieuwsblad, De Standaard and
De Morgen were included. It is important to mention
that VTM and Q Music are run based on advertisements
only and hence offer their content for free, whereas all
the other newspapers here operate some form of hy-
brid/metered paywall, offering a combination of free and
a paid news offerings.
4. Findings
Before looking specifically at the levels of (self-reported)
trust in the public broadcaster amongst Flemish news
users, we analyse how the public broadcasters’ offline
and online channels compare to those of commercial
players in terms of use.
4.1. Reach of PSM News Is Big but Differs Significantly
across Age and Education
Our data show, firstly, that VRT is still widely used for
news in Flanders. All VRT channels and brands com-
bined are regularly used by 60% of Flemish news users.
Secondly, while VRT is dominant offline, it has not been
able to hold that same position online. Its television
channels are regularly used by 33% of Flemish news
users, slightly more than main commercial channel VTM.
Online, however, only 23% of Flemish news users reg-
ularly turn to its news site. Here, VRTNWS is outper-
formed by the online offering of the commercial news-
paper Het Laatste Nieuws (39%) and closely followed by
Het Nieuwsblad (22%). Thirdly, behind the general num-
bers lie important differences in terms of the target audi-
ences and competition with commercial partners. Let us
zoom in on how VRT’s reach for news differs across age,
education level, and political orientation.
4.1.1. Age
VRT regularly reaches 52%of news users between 18 and
24 years old (see Table 1 in Supplementary File Annex 1).
VRT reaches the youngwith newsmainly through its ded-
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icated radio stations (29%), Stubru and MNM. Television
is clearly a more difficult story. Reach is almost twice
as high amongst regular users over 35 years old (38%)
as amongst those under 35 years (20%). Is VRT reach-
ing more young people via its website or social me-
dia (see Table 2 in Supplementary File Annex 1)? No.
Online reach (21%) is only slightly higher than television
amongst the 18 to 24 years old. What is maybe most
remarkable here is that VRTNWS is performing particu-
larly poorly amongst the ‘millennial’ age group of 24 to
34 year olds (14%) and has the highest reach in the over
35 age group (25%). So, VRT reaches younger audiences
mainly through its dedicated radio stations and has not
yet managed to convert its decreasing TV audience into
an online audience.
One might, of course, suspect young people to be
a tough audience. So how does VRT compare to other
popular news brands in this regard? Once more, VRT’s
niche radios perform well as they reach more young
people than any other news brand. Admittedly, we are
talking about hourly news updates here, not in-depth
coverage. When we turn to television, één (VRT) and
VTM (DPGMedia) provide the only two television news
bulletins in Flanders, which are comparable in terms of
length, frequency, and format. Both provide additional
current affairs shows, but VRT offers significantly more
of these through its second channel Canvas. Even with
both channels combined, VTM (26%) is performing bet-
ter amongst the youngest age group than VRT (19%).
Popular newspaper Het Laatste Nieuws reaches roughly
the same amount of 18 to 24 years old (18%) as the pub-
lic broadcasters’ television stations. Online, Het Laatste
Nieuws leads the pack (36%) by a large margin, but VRT
NWS (21%) is doing a much better job in reaching young
people online than the other newspapers’ websites (see
Table 2 in Supplementary File Annex 1). VTM and Het
Laatste Nieuws are also part of the same media group,
DPG Media, and since the latter took full ownership of
VTM, cross-promotion between the newspaper and the
television channel has increased. In short, VRT’s main
commercial counterpart, DPGMedia, is doing a better job
at reaching younger audiences both offline and online.
4.1.2. Education
When it comes to education levels (see Table 3 in
Supplementary File Annex 1), VRT brands reach more
higher-educated (70%) than middle- (49%) or lower-
educated (56%) citizens. Whereas VTM (37%) reaches a
greater number of lower educated citizens through tele-
vision than VRT (28%), VRT reaches more of them than
the popular newspaper Het Laatste Nieuws (25%).
We see a similar picture online (see Table 4 in
Supplementary File Annex 1): VRT NWS (32%) and
Het Laatste Nieuws (37%) both reach a significant por-
tion of the higher-educated, but whereas Het Laatste
Nieuws reaches a similar percentage of the lower-
(41%) and middle-educated (41%), VRT NWS reaches
much less of them (18%), being surpassed also by
Het Nieuwsblad (20%) amongst these groups. Again,
compared to De Standaard (5%) and De Morgen (4%),
VRT performs better here. So, VRT reaches fewer lower-
and middle-educated people than popular brands but
reaches more of them than other quality brands. It thus
takes a middle-ground position.
4.1.3. Political Orientation
When looking at political orientation (see Table 5 in
Supplementary File Annex 1), we see a rather nuanced
view. Overall, VRT brands do not show a great deal of
variation between left-, centre-, and right-wing citizens,
reaching 65%, 64%, and 58% of each group, respectively.
Through its television stations, VRT reachesmore citizens
on the left (40%) than the right (30%), but this is not
the case through its broad radio networks (22% vs. 27%).
VTM is even more ‘polarised’ in terms of the political ori-
entation of its audience (19% vs. 35%), leaning more to-
wards the right. Online (see Table 6 in Supplementary
File Annex 1), this discrepancy is almost completely ab-
sent in the audience of VRT NWS, especially compared
to its competitors.
4.2. PSM is the Most Trusted News Brand across
Education and Political Orientation
Trust in the news, in general, is relatively high in Flanders,
even if a slight downward trend has recently been
detected. In 2020, Flanders was ranked 6th amongst
the 40 countries surveyed in Newman et al. (2020).
When it comes to social media and search engines, on
the other hand, Flanders is much more aligned with
other countries.
In our sample, when asked whether they agreed that
most news can be trustedmost of the time, 56% said yes,
although when asked the same question about news via
search engines and via social media, only 28% and 16%
agreed, respectively. Clearly, news obtained through the
intermediary of powerful technology companies is less
trusted. Only 39% of the 18 to 24 age group agreed that
they generally trusted the news compared to 56% of
those over 35: a notable difference. Across educational
levels, we only see slightly higher trust levels amongst
the higher-educated, and regarding political orientation,
there are slightly higher trust levels on the left. For trust
in social media, one might suspect trust to be higher
amongst younger generations as they are more likely to
turn to social media for news. Hoverer, only 18% of those
under 35 years old agree that news via social media can
be trusted most of the time, compared to 15% of the
group above 35 years old. Trust and use thus do not al-
ways match.
Against that background, VRT NWS succeeds in be-
ing the most trusted of the brands in our analysis,
with an average score of 7.3 out of 10, outperform-
ing not only the news of main commercial broadcaster
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VTM (7), newspaper/site Het Laatste Nieuws (6.5), and
radio Q Music (6.2), but also main quality newspapers
like De Standaard (7) and De Morgen (6.6). The public
broadcaster might not always be the most used news
brand, but it is still the most trusted. That observation
is confirmed also by the high market share of VRT NWS
during the Coronavirus crisis (PDE, 2020). On the other
hand, the scores of VRT and its main competitors are not
that far apart.
4.2.1. Age
When looking at trust in relation to age (see Figure 1),
we can conclude that, in general, Flemish news users
under 35 years old tend to score news brands lower
than those above 35, albeit with some notable excep-
tions. Also worth noting is that for every brand, the 25
to 35 age group is the least trusting, which could be
due to their specific life phase. Still, amongst this age
group, as amongst those over 35, the public broadcaster
remains the most trusted brand, even holding up against
quality newspapers. This is not the case amongst the
18 to 24 year olds. Not only do they trust VRT signifi-
cantly less than those older than 35, but they also trust
VTM more than VRT. VTM combines its higher reach in
this age group with a (slightly) higher trust score. And
while the use of De Standaard and De Morgen is much
lower amongst this age group, the quality news brands
resonate in terms of trust. This shows that while young
people have much lower trust in the news in general,
they do trust the main news brands, including the pub-
lic broadcaster. It might indicate that young people, in
particular, have developed a more cautious way of navi-
gating the news, being critical about news in general, but
using a ‘traditional’ compass which guides them towards
the more trusted brands.
4.2.2. Education
We see more remarkable differences when considering
education levels (see Figure 2). Higher-educated citizens
trust VRT’s news radio Radio 1 significantly more than
lower-educated citizens, who in turn trust commercial
brands like Het Laatste Nieuws and VTM Nieuws more
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Figure 1. Trust in news brands by age. Notes: The question was ‘How trustworthy would you say news from the following
brands is? Please use the scale below, where 0 is “not at all trustworthy” and 10 is “completely trustworthy.”’ See Table 1
in Supplementary File Annex 2 for exact numbers and statistical significance tests.
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Figure 2. Trust in news brands by education level. Notes: The question was ‘How trustworthy would you say news from the
following brands is? Please use the scale below, where 0 is “not at all trustworthy” and 10 is “completely trustworthy.”’See
Table 2 in Supplementary File Annex 2 for exact numbers and statistical significance tests.
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than higher-educated users. This seems to correspond
broadly with reach: VRT and DPG Media reach more
higher- and lower-educated citizens respectively and are
also trusted more amongst those groups. But while trust
in brands such as Het Laatste Nieuws and VTM drops
significantly amongst the higher-educated, this does not
hold for trust in VRT NWS amongst the lower-educated.
VRT NWS, and also Radio 2, is much less differentiating in
terms of education levels, especially when compared to
VTM and Het Laatste Nieuws. Except for its information
radio Radio 1, trust in VRT is quite similar across educa-
tion levels.
4.2.3. Political Orientation
A similar pattern can be seen between people on the
right showing slightly lower trust scores across all me-
dia, except for popular news brands Het Nieuwsblad en
Het Laatste Nieuws, where trust is lower amongst left-
wing citizens (Figure 3). In particular, trust in Het Laatste
Nieuws is significantly lower amongst left-wing citizens.
Trust in the public broadcaster, while still high, is in turn
significantly lower amongst people on the right than on
the left and in the centre. Here, it is VTM that seems to be
the least ‘polarising’ brand. This right–left divide in trust
is in line with the discourse and policies of right-wing po-
litical parties in Flanders, which have been critical about
the scope and editorial decisionsmade by VRT. Still, even
amongst citizens leaning to the right of the political spec-
trum, VRT remains the most trusted source amongst the
brands covered. Again here, what might be a more accu-
rate description is that trust in VRT NWS amongst right-
wing voters is high and particularly high amongst left-
wing voters.
5. Conclusions
Our research shows that VRT still reaches a lot of citi-
zens and that its reach is higher among older and more
highly educated people. While being a market leader in
radio and television, VRT has less reach with its online
news offerings. The popular news brands of DPG Media
and Mediahuis lead, with VRT being in the middle, and
quality newspapers following with their news sites. VRT
reaches fewer young people although, unlike commer-
cial media, the discrepancy between age groups mani-
fests itself mostly in relation to television rather than its
online news offers. For radio, channels such as Stubru
and MNM seem to be effective means of aiming infor-
mation at young people. Essentially, data shows that VRT
is no exception, and follows the major trends in news
consumption thatWestern and North European PSM are
generally confrontedwith (Schulz, Levy, & Nielsen, 2019).
The status of online news differs somewhat with some
public broadcasters such as the British BBC and Irish
RTE being very competitive with their commercial online
news offers.
Is the low reach of VRT with young people, com-
pared to tabloid-like brands such as Het Laatste Nieuws
and its website hln.be, a problem? Not per se. It might
be logical that VRT reaches fewer young people com-
pared to brands with more celebrity news, human in-
terest, etc., as younger audiences, paradoxically, do not
necessarily prioritise the consumption of ‘serious’ news
over ‘light’ news, even if they deem the former more
important (Costera Meijer, 2007). As most commercial
news websites are increasingly putting their articles be-
hind pay-walls, reach with young people might fall as
willingness-to-pay is low within this group (Flamingo,
2019). At the same time, radio brands such as Stubru
and MNM are experimenting with online-only content,
also in the news domain, and might see their reach in-
crease further. As such, VRT, through its various brands,
is still feeding information with alternative perspectives
into the high-choice news environment for people to con-
sume at their own pace.
When we look at trust instead of reach, we see a dif-
ferent picture. VRT remains themost trusted news brand,
even though most of its commercial counterparts also
show high trust levels. The high level of trust in the news
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Figure 3. Trust in news brands by political orientation. Notes: The questionwas ‘How trustworthy would you say news from
the following brands is? Please use the scale below, where 0 is “not at all trustworthy” and 10 is “completely trustworthy.”’
See Table 3 in Supplementary File Annex 2 for exact numbers and statistical significance tests.
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and most news brands in Flanders remains remarkable
and might be the result of strong news brands (includ-
ing those of VRT), the relatively slow take-up of digital
news and a lack of big media scandals. Here too, break-
ing down the numbers shows a more nuanced situation.
Themore highly educated people have higher trust levels
in news overall whereas older people and people with a
left-wing orientations trust VRTmore than the young and
those with right-wing orientations. The latter have lower
trust in the news generally, and their trust in VRT is still
high. Young people (18 to 24 years old) trust the commer-
cial broadcaster VTM more than VRT. That is somewhat
concerning and should be looked into further.
Still, if we consider VRT as an organisation that should
be optimised for trust rather than reach, then it would
definitely meet its goals. This is important when we con-
ceive citizens as publicly connected rather than strictly
informed citizens. In that case, the presence of a trusted
PSM in the ecosystem remains key, even if not always
used. It also opens up the debate on competition. The
scope of the PSM should not be to compete with others
to attract the largest audience, nor should PSM be eval-
uated on that. Rather, it should be assessed on trust and
how it works to maintain trust.
Even when putting trust first though, challenges can
arise. If we look at young people, we see that in terms
of trust, VTM scores slightly better. A commercial player,
too, can succeed in providing news that is trusted by a
younger audience. That offers interesting avenues for hy-
potheses. The main question here is: would VTM ever
have reached this level of trust if it had not been forced
to compete with VRT? Or the other way round, would
VRT have the reach it has if it had not been forced
to take into consideration the more ‘user-friendly’ ap-
proach of VTM?
The study at hand is leading us to question our view
on the place of PSM in the news ecosystem.We conceive
their impact to be valued, not so much on the level of a
single organisation finding an online audience, but of an
organisation injecting a specific kind of information and
journalistic practice in the system for the whole system
to benefit from. Previous studies have linked the pres-
ence of PSM to an overall higher degree of trust in both
institutions and individuals andhave linked the individual
use of PSM with higher levels of social trust and trust in
the media (Kalogeropoulos, Suiter, Udris, & Eisenegger,
2019, p. 3678). Assessing PSM from the perspective of
trust and defining performance accordingly carves out a
specific place for PSM in the public domain. This is a place
that should be less governed by reaching people with in-
formation but by injecting trustworthy information into
the ecosystem.
This perspective steps away from an all too market-
driven logic of PSM as broad crowd-pleasers, but on the
other hand does not focus on a too informed public ei-
ther, whichwould reduce it to amere hard news informa-
tion provider. Rather, it puts forward the need for PSM to
be a trusted source. In Flanders, despite what right-wing
politicians might claim, VRT still is that trusted source
amongst its main stakeholders, namely its citizens.
Still, further reflection is needed on how to study
and assess this role. Such an assessment will always de-
pend on the indicators used. Increased competition of
global tech giants and editorial analytics permeating pub-
lic and private newsrooms do not offer the most fertile
ground for discussing audience metrics that go beyond
reach. Indicators valuing trust next to reach require a less
information-centric view on citizenship to start with. In
order to develop such an indicator, further research will
be necessary that also tackles some of the limitations of
this study. Firstly, qualitative research can help us under-
stand why young people prefer one news source over an-
other. It will also shed light on their trust in news media
and their appreciation of core PSM values such as inde-
pendence, impartiality, and quality. Secondly, while the
focus of this article was on news consumption and trust,
a more comprehensive account of news repertoires and
their social stratification will add to a more layered and
contextualized understanding of news consumption.
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